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FEDERALLY OWNED CORPORATIONS AND
THEIR LEGAL PROBLEMS
ROBERT

H. SCHNELL*

I
An effective device in the technique of governmental administration which has reached full development during the past few years is
the use of a corporation entirely owned and operated by the federal
government. This has become a favored method of carrying out plans
and projects. Such government corporations are of two major types.
One is the individual corporation entirely owned by the government
and functioning directly as a federal agency. The government now
directly owns and operates about twenty separate corporations of this
type, the best known of which are probably the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Home Owners
Loan Corporation.' The other type is represented by groups of corporations, the members of which receive their charters directly from
Congress or from some agency designated by Congress for that purpose. Such corporations are supervised by the government and used
as governmental instrumentalities. Sometimes the government owns
all or a part of their capital stock and at other times it has no direct
pecuniary interest in them. These groups of corporations operate in
the field of home, farm, and commercial credit and financing. The
Federal Land Banks, the Joint Stock Land Banks, the Production
2
Credit Corporations, and the National Banks are of this second type.
The right of Congress to create corporations for the execution
of the powers conferred by the Constitution and the propriety of designating the corporations so created as agencies or instrumentalities of
the government have been discussed and sustained in cases concerning
* Sterling Fellow in Law, Yale University, 1934-35.

'Some of the other corporations are the Panama Railroad Company, the
Inland Waterways Corporation, the Warrior River Terminal Company, the RFC
Mortgage Company, the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Commodity Credit Corporation, the ExportImport Banks, the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation, the Electric Home and
Farm Authority.
'Some of the other groups of corporations are the National Farm Loan Associations, the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, the National Agricultural
Credit Corporations, the Banks for Co6peratives, the Production Credit Associations, the Federal Credit Unions, the Federal Home Loan Banks, the Federal
Savings and Loan Associations, the National Mortgage Associations.

FEDERALLY OWNED CORPORATIONS
the Second Bank of the United States,n a canal company, 4 a National
Bank,5 an interstate railroad, 6 and a private corporation organized to
build a bridge between New York and New Jersey. The power to
create government, owned corporations has been directly upheld in
McCullough v. Maryland8 and Smith v. Kansas City Title and Trust
Company9 in which the currency and fiscal powers were held sufficient
to sustain the Second Bank of the United States and the Federal Land
Banks and Joint Stock Land Banks.
The right to own and use the present day corporations, as such,
is unquestioned, but the operations of each individual corporation may
have to be justified under some constitutional power. The legality of
each of these agencies will depend not on its form but rather on what
it is doing and authorized to do, as will also the various operations of
each of the corporations.' 0 These constitutional questions will not
be discussed in this article." Nor will the creation, organization, and
actual operations of the several corporations be described.' 2 Emphasis will be placed instead upon legal problems (other than constitutionality) concerning the corporations.
' McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819) ; Osborn v. Bank

of the United States, 22 U. S. 738, 6 L. ed. 204 (1824).
'Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U. S. 91, 9 L. ed. 1012 (1833).
'Farmers' and Mechanics' National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29, 23 L. ed.
196 (1875).
'California v. Central Pacific Railroad Co., 127 U. S. 1, 8 Sup. Ct. 1073, 32
L. ed. 150 (1888).
Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525, 14 Sup. Ct 891, 38 L. ed.
808 (1894) (Congress has power to construct bridges over navigable waters between states for the accommodation of interstate commerce by land and it may
exercise such power through a corporation).
817 U. S. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819).
'255 U. S. 180, 41 Sup. Ct. 243, 65 L. ed. 577 (1921).

" For example, the Tennessee Valley Authority was upheld in Ashwander
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 56 Sup. Ct. 466 (1936), but the decision is limited
to the construction and operation of Wilson Dam for purposes of national defense and improvement of navigation.
"The constitutionality of the now operating government owned corporations
has been thoroughly discussed in a recent law review article, Culp, Creation of
Government Corporations by the National Government (1935) 33 MicH. L. Rv.
473.
'For discussions of the organization and operations of past and present federally owned corporations, see, VAN DORN, GOVERNMENT CORPORaTIOSIS (New
York, 1926).; Chase, Government in Business (1935) 41 CURRENT HISTORY 641;

Note (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 346; (Note) Incorporationof Federal Agencies
(1934) 28 ILL. L. RFv. 1082; Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations
(1935) 21 VA. L. REv. 351, 465; SCHmECKEBIER, Nzv FEDERAL ORGANIZATIONS
(Wash. 1934); DImocK, GOVERNMENT-OPERATED ENTERPRISES IN THE PANAMA

CANAL ZONE (Chicago, 1934); (Note) The Tennessee Valley Authority Act
(1934) 43 YALE L. J. 815; (Note) State Tawation. and Regulation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 326; BnWsTEiR, AN OUTLINE OF
THE NEw DEAL ADMINISTRATION (Washington, 1934).
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Before consideration is given to such legal problems concerning
government owned corporations, the use of the corporate form of organization -by the government as an administrative device warrants
consideration. The main question which offers itself for an attempted
solution is, Why are corporations used instead of some other administrative organization? Secondarily, Since corporations are used, why
are they not all federal corporations chartered by Congress? Why have
some of them been incorporated under state laws? From these main
questions spring a number of incidental questions and propositions
which likewise deserve consideration.
Various reasons have been set forth by the text writers as to the
advantages of general incorporation. A corporation is a convenient
method of combining and using a large amount of capital, contributed
by one or many individuals, without further liability to those financing the enterprise. Further, it enables these persons to act as a single
individual. A business operated by a corporation may be carried on
continuously without regard to the death of one or more of the owners
or to the transfer of interests from one owner to another. And the
concentration of the management of the business in the hands of the
officers and directors leaves the other owners free to follow other enterprises of their own.1 3 The existence of the corporation is separate
from that of its stockholders, and large business enterprises can be
operated more easily and efficiently by a corporation acting as a unit
than if all the owners of the business tried to run it directly. Also,
the transfer of ownership of the business as represented by the shares
14
of stock is much easier than if the undertaking were not incorporated.
However, these reasons for incorporation do not seem to be valid
when applied to government ownership and operation of an enterprise. The idea of a separate corporate entity does often have a psychological advantage, but not always, because the cases have either respected or disregarded the corporate entity, depending upon the situation presented to the courts. The only other advantage of this type that
the government might obtain would be to limit its liability in the undertaking of the specific corporation. But in view of the large capital
provided 'by the government for its corporations and the probability
that the government itself will make up any further losses incurred
by them, as it did in the case of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, this
1 TH oPsoN, COpwoRATioNs (3d ed. 1927) §5.

I1 Coox, CORPORATioNS (8th ed. 1923) §1, n. 2. See also, Flint v. Stone Tracy
Co., 220 U. S. 107, 162, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. ed. 389 (1910) ; Munson, One Man

Companies (1895) 11 LAw QuARry REviEw 185; CLAxK, ColoRATiOxNs (3d.
ed. 1916) ch. 1 passim.
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does not seem to be among the reasons for the use of the corporate device in governmental operations.
The main reason advanced for the use of corporations by the government is that the corporate form is a convenient method of operation providing elasticity of control and freedom from the usual governmental red tape. 15 This general proposition has been stated in
various ways at different times and has also been divided up into a number of specific advantages said to be gained from the use of government owned corporations.
It has been said that the ordinary machinery of government is too
cumbersome to operate speedily and efficiently.' 6 A corporation is
supposed to be better able to act along strictly business lines than is
the government itself. 17 And the use of a corporation permits government officials to do things without encountering the usual system of
governmental checks arid balances.18
'The earliest modern presentation of this was in a statement made to a Senate Committee in 1905 by William Howard Taft, then Secretary of War. He
said: "I hope that nothing will be done to merge the corporate entity of the
[Panama] Railroad Company into that of the Government or the [Isthmian Canal]
Commission. Under the present arrangement, it is just as easy to have close
supervision over the management of the railroad as if it were nominally operated
by the Commission, and the corporate form secures the utmost convenience and
elasticity of control." Statement of Hon. William H. Taft, Secretary of War,
Before tie Comnnittee on Interoceanic Canals of the United States Senate (Washington, 1905) 32.
" Edward N. Hurley was the wartime chairman of the United States Shipping Board. In his book concerning the activities of the Shipping Board and
the Emergency Fleet Corporation he praises the use of the corporate agency to
carry out the war shipping program. He says that the Shipping Act was wisely
drawn "in so far as the necessity of building ships with the machinery of a
private corporation was recognized. It is to the credit of Congress," he adds,
"that it recognized the utter hopelessness of relying upon the cumbrous machinery of the government to build merchant ships for war or peace." He also
holds that the system of governmental checks and balances makes the use of
a corporation preferable to the use of a regular governmental agency when it is
necessary to carry out a large project speedily. HURzLY, THE BRIDGE To FRANCa
(Philadelphia, 1927) 23-24.
"7Annual ,Report of the Inland Waterways Corporationfor the Calendar Year
1925 (Gov't Printing Office, 1926) 1-5.
"' See, SuWuAca, THE GRAIN TRADE DURING THE WORLD WAR (New York,
1928) at 50: "After much consideration it was decided that the most satisfactory
form of organization for this purpose [stabilization of the price of wheat and
regulation of the wheat market] would be that of a private corporation organized
under the laws of some State.... This corporate form of organization would
permit the government agency to carry on active trading operations, and to expeditiously and economically work through the established marketing machinery
of the country. The ordinary rules of the United States Treasury for making
purchases and receiving money are far too cumbersome to be of service in the
kind of operations which it was proposed to carry on."
District Judge Mayer said in Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. U. S. Sugar
Equalization Board, Inc., 268 Fed. 575, 587 (S.D. N. Y. 1920): "The very incorporation of defendant, The Sugar Board, demonstrates that the ordinary methods of transacting business by executive departments was inadequate, and doubtless subject to embarrassment by a maze of unworkable statutes and regulations,
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These theories were expressed by Mr. Justice Brandeis in a case
in which the Emergency Fleet Corporation was held to be a department of the government within the meaning of the Post Roads Act
and entitled to preferential telegraph rates. The Justice said, "An important, if not the chief reason for employing a corporate agency was
to enable the Government to employ commercial methods and to conduct the operations with a freedom supposed to be inconsistent with
accountability to the Treasury under its established procedure and
with its control over the financial operations of the United States.' 9
More recently, this was a little differently expressed by President
Roosevelt who, in his message to Congress concerning the development of the Tennessee Valley, proposed "legislation to create a Tennessee Valley Authority-a corporation clothed with the power of government but possessed of the flexibility and initiative of a private enterprise."2 0
The United States News, in an article concerning government corporations, said: "The Government 'corporation' to-day is replacing the
Government 'commission' as the favored agency through which the
and that the elastic powers of a business corporation would enable the purchase
and sale of sugar to be engaged in with the same facility as such transactions
ordinarily go forward at the hands of individuals or business corporations."
See also, BERxmARDT, GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF THE SUGAR INDUSTRY IN THE
UNITED STATES (New York, 1920) ch. 3.
"U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Western Union, 275 U. S. 415,
423, 48 Sup. Ct. 198, 201, 72 L. ed. 345, 349 (1928).
The same language was used by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Skinner and Eddy
Corp. v. McCarl, 275 U. S. 1, 8, 48 Sup. Ct. 12, 14, 72 L. ed. 131, 135 (1927).
Mr. Justice McReynolds has said: "Generally agents of a corporation are not
agents of the stockholders and cannot contract for the latter. Apparently this is
one reason why Congress authorized organization of the Fleet Corporation."
United States v. Strang, 254 U. S. 491, 493, 41 Sup. Ct. 165, 166, 65 L. ed. 368,
370 (1921).
Mr. Justice Stone has said: "The Emergency Fleet Corporation was created
as a government agency to construct a fleet of vessels to meet a wartime emergency. It was in order to better fulfill that purpose that Congress chose an instrument having the power to contract, as well as all the other powers of a private corporation, but with its every action government controlled and all its assets supplied from government sources. The advantages of resorting to such
powers in reeting the national emergency were used as grounds for the choice
of this particular form of agency when the Urgent Deficiency Bill was pending
in Congress." U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Harwood, 281 U. S.
519, 525, 50 Sup. Ct. 372, 373, 74 L. ed. 1011, 1015 (1930).
' Tennessee Valley Authority, General Information (Dec., 1933) 1.
See also, Executive Order of President Wilson authorizing the Grain Corporation: "Whereas, in order to enable the United States Food Administration
to efficiently exercise the authority granted by said act . . . and to enable said
United States Food Administration to purchase and sell said commodities in the
manner and by methods customarily followed in the trade, it is expedient and
necessary that a Corporation should be organized, all the stock of which . . .
shall be ... owned by the United States." Executive Order No. 2681, Aug. 14,
1917.
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President acts to get things done in a hurry ....

They provide the

Executive with ready means for cutting through the red tape that entwines the regular governmental organizations, and for getting around
legal restrictions that might hamper action in syphoning money from
1
the Treasury to the vast new Federal projects."'
It has evidently been felt by the various people interested that the
government itself is not suited for business enterprises. They seem
distrustful of the ability of a bureau or commission or other governmental department to function in an efficient and businesslike manner.
This proposition, by itself, does not seem valid. There is no reason
why, for example, a bureau in the War Department named the Tennessee Valley Division could not operate as efficiently and perform the
same functions as an independent corporation called the Tennessee
Valley Authority. The tradition of governmental inefficiency, in general, could be changed by the application by a specific governmental
agency of the same methods as are used by a business corporation. Besides, all business corporations are not operated efficiently as is shown
by their numerous bankruptcies.
This general theory of the inability of the government to use efficient business methods seems to be a general and probably incomplete
summary of the various specific reasons why there is a desire to use a
government owned corporation instead of some regular branch of the
government.
For example, a corporation's own legal staff or counsel handles
actions by or against the corporation at all stages. Ordinarily, when a
government agency goes to court, the Department of Justice handles
the case. However, a corporation can have the advantage of having
its case handled 'by counsel familiar with and interested in the general field and acquainted with the specific points in suit. A suit by
the United States, in litigation, can be compromised only by the Attorney-General. However, the officers and legal staff of a corporation
may do as they please concerning the action at any stage of the proceedings.
Similarly, no money claim by or against the United States may be
compromised except by the Solicitor of the Treasury Department.
However, the corporate device offers the advantage of flexibility in exercise of discretion concerning claims. The corporation can settle
claims against it in any manner it sees fit; and, whenever necessary or
advisable, it can write off or remit all or any part of a loan it has made
or a claim it possesses.
'The United States News, vol. 1, no. 22, Oct. 16, 1933, at 341.
See also, N. Y. Herald Tribune, May 19, 1935, §11, at 1.
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The ability to sue and be sued in the corporate name as a separate
entity is also considered an advantage. The government is not subject to suit except as it may permit, but a corporation may be sued at
22
any time for anything.
The actual administrative advantages of a corporation are pointed
to as among the reasons why the corporate form is used. For example, counsel for one of them has pointed out that the creation of a corporation and the allocation to it of a particular function centers its
administration and makes it easier for the general public and the other
government departments and agencies to deal with it. The operations
and activities of the corporation can 'be carried on efficiently and rapidly under decisions of its own officers. Contracts may be entered into
by the corporations without the necessity of complying with the formalities required for the making of contracts with the regular departments of the government.
The financing of a corporation and its activities is easier than if it
were a regular branch of the executive department. The corporation
has two sources of funds, paid in capital and borrowed money. These
are provided for in its charter and in the legislation or executive order
setting it up. With -these funds available, the corporation is- not dependent upon annual appropriations by Congress. Usually the capital
fund of the corporation, provided of course out of government monies,
is large enough to provide for continued operation of the corporation
without further appeals to Congress. Furthermore, each of the corporations is usually authorized to borrow money upon its own credit.
Although maximum amounts which may be borrowed are usually fixed,
they are large enough not to hinder the financial operations of the corporation.
A further advantage of having independent funds is that their use
by the corporation is not limited except by a broad general policy. The
ordinary Congressional appropriation may be expended for bnly the
objects authorized. However, a corporation is able to use its free
discretion in the expenditure of its funds.
Another reason for the creation as administrative agencies of some
of the corporations was their freedom from the rules of the Treasury
Department and later the General Accounting Office. Unless otherwise
ordered, each corporation developed and used its own system of accounting and auditing. This freedom from accounting rules and practices and from checks by the General Accounting Office eliminated
I See, post pp. 249-253.
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most of the red tape ordinarily surrounding governmental expenditures
and made it easier for the corporations to carry on their progams. 23
However, this advantage is not now available to government corporations. On January 3rd, 1934, an executive order 24 was issued
ordering that all accounts of all receipts and expenditures by governmental agencies, including corporations, created after March 3rd, 1933,
the accounting procedure for which is not otherwise prescribed by law,
shall be rendered to the General Accounting Office in such manner, to
such extent, and at such times as the Comptroller-General may prescribe, for settlement and adjustment pursuant to the act 2 5 setting up
the General Accounting Office. This order, together with provisions
in most of the charters granted by Congress, now makes the government owned corporations comply with the same accounting practices
and rules as the other government agencies.
These reasons as to why corporations are used apply generally to
all the government owned corporations regardless of the method of
their inception. However, another question arises-why are State incorporated agencies used?
A reason given for the organization of one of the state chartered
agencies is that a program involving the use of a corporation was
planned for immediate execution while Congress was not in session
and so the officials in charge went to Delaware for a charter.
Another reason given for state incorporation, whether Congress
was in session or not, was the desire to avoid Congressional action. It
was easier to organize a corporation as authorized by executive order
than to introduce a bill in Congress for the chartering of the same
corporation, and have Congressional hearings, debates, and inquiries.
Furthermore, the passage of a charter through Congress was likely to
be a slow procedure, and rapid organization was desired. Also, while
it was possible that Congress might refuse to charter a corporation to
carry out some proposed project, it was improbable that once a state
corporation had been organized and the project gotten under way that
Congress would order the corporation dissolved and liquidated.
Five of the recent government corporations are organized under
the laws of Delaware. The usual reason given as to why Delaware
was chosen in preference to another state is that the Delaware corporation laws are extremely liberal and especially suitable for the type of
I This freedom is criticized by McGuire, Govenment by Corporations (1928)
14 VA. L. REV. 182. Mr. McQuire was and is counsel in the General Accounting

Office.

EXECUTITW ORDER

No. 6549, Jan. 3, 1934.

"Title III of the Act of June 10, 1921, 42

STAT.

23 (1921).
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government corporation desired. And in addition, the state of Delaware waived the payment of incorporation taxes and annual franchise
taxes and also permitted the first meeting of incorporation to be held
outside the state.
The Export-Import Banks were chartered in the District of Columbia and the Tennessee Valley Associated Co6peratives, Incorporated
was incorporated under the laws of Tennessee. The Banks were incorporated in the District of Columbia so that they could perform a
banking business there as domestic corporations. The Co~peratives
Corporation was probably incorporated in Tennessee because it was
the most convenient place. It was organized under the auspices of
the Tennessee Valley Authority, which has its headquarters in Tennessee, as an affiliate. This seems to 'be the most apparent reason for
selecting that state as a place of incorporating in preference to Delaware.
In addition to these reasons already presented for the government's
use of corporations for carrying out certain functions, there seems to
be another type of explanation which might be listed as psychological.
Several different ideas and attitudes enter, into the making up of this
classification.
There is an American tradition against the government's going into
what is commonly called "business." Yet the government actually
is operating various business enterprises through its corporations. The
corporate device readily lends itself to reconciling these two conflicting
facts. Technically, the corporation is a unit separate and distinct from
the government. The theory of a corporate entity can be applied even
though the United States owns all the stock and the corporation's poliies are formulated by highly placed government officials. There
seems to be conveyed to the minds of the bystanders the inchoate idea
that even though the government owns and runs these corporations they
26
are not quite the government.
Along the same line it might also be argued that the use of these
corporations helps the government's credit because the debts of the
corporation are not the debts of the government itself. Bonds which
the corporations issue represent corporate indebtedness although the
United States may guarantee the bonds. While the government will
"The writer questioned numerous persons, at random, as to their idea of the
status of such government corporations as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, and the Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation. The general response was that these were not engaged directly in governmental operations. The government itself was not acting when
these corporations did things. Rather, these were thought of as separate agencies
under the patronage and supervision of the government and financed with federal funds.
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ultimately bear any losses incurred, at present such indebtedness of the
corporations is only a contingent debt of the Treasury.
Again, the idea of the government's going into business in competition with private enterprise and making money out of its operations is
objected to by some people. However, it is expected that few, if any,
of the government owned corporations will ultimately show a loss.
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation sho'ved a net profit of
$65,175,963.18 for its operations from February 2nd, 1932, through
December 31st, 1934. The Panama Railroad Company shows a net
profit each year, and similarly the Inland Waterways Corporation is
currently earning a small margin of profit. The Export-Import Banks,
the Electric Home and Farm Authority, and the Tennessee Valley
Authority are expected not to lose money. The Home Owners' Loan
Corporation and the Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation are
taking ample security on the money they loan; and, even though they
may have to take over some of the properties upon default on the mortgages, the corporations expect to liquidate eventually with a net profit.
If these were branches of the executive departments conducting business operations and loaning money, there would probably be more objection than there is now to having what is called a corporation do the
same things.
Another aspect of this general idea is the use of names and the effect it has on the general public. Opposition to the government's actually
loaning almost five billion dollars with another two billion authorized
to various enterprises through a separate agency called the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is probably much less than if the same
thing were done by a "Loan Division of the Treasury Department."
Then also, there is the impression that the proper agency to carry on
business enterprises is a corporation. The word "corporation" generally connotes successful and large scale business enterprises, which
it might be improper or unsuitable for the government to conduct itself.
This idea ties in with what was said previously concerning the attitude
that regular governmental machinery is too cumbersome to operate efficiently and expeditiously.
Furthermore, there is less likelihood of having Congress interfere
in the operations of a corporation than of a governmental department.
After the corporation is chartered and its general policy outlined, it
is generally permitted to operate free from any other interference or
control. A corporation seems to be something that is further from the
reach of Congress than a regular agency. Of course, this is actually
not so because the stock of the corporations is owned by or on behalf
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of the United States; and Congress, representing the government, can
direct how the stock shall be voted and the corpbrations run. But
the aura of the corporation as an independent unit serves generally to
prevent Congress from so doing. There have been and still are instances in which legislation has been'enacted involving existing and
already operating corporations. 27 Such legislation has usually affected
only the general policy of the corporation involved or has been de28
signed to widen its powers.
The particular advantages ascribed to the corporate device could
easily enough be given to any other agency. For example, Congress
could set up a division in one of the departments and make exceptions
for it as far as the applicability of the general rules pertaining to the
Justice and Treasury Departments and the General Accounting Office
is concerned. An agency of the government, called by any name desired, operating within one of the executive departments could be
given similar powers and functions as have 'been given to agencies
called corporations. However, there are drawbacks to this possibility.
If Congress began to make exceptions in favor of specific agencies,
immediately other agencies would want similar exceptions made on
their behalf. There would probably be a scramble among the various
agencies for concessions and preferences to an even greater extent than
is now true. And exceptions in some instances might open the way
for a break down of the general rules set forth for the operation of
governmental departments. And even were Congress willing to go
ahead and make it just as practical and advantageous to utilize another
named agency instead of a corporation, the psychological advantages
which inhere in the use of a corporation would be lost.
An alternative would be the passage by Congress of some type of
general incorporation law applying to government owned corporations.
One type might be a general law which would be compulsory for all
corporations engaged in interstate commerce or in carrying out any
powers of the federal government. 20 Or such a statute might be restricted so as to apply only to all corporations federally owned and
See, for example, Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, as amended, 15
U. S. C. A. §§601 et seq. (1935).

'However, in the case of the Sugar Equalization Board Congress did direct
the conduct of a particular transaction. See, Joint Resolution of Feb. 9, 1923, 42
STAT. 1224; Joint Resolution of Feb. 12, 1923, 42 STAT. 1226.
See, Schnell and Wettach, Corporations as Agencies of the Recovery Program (1934) 12 N. C. L. RLv. 77, 97.
See also, Thelen, Federal Incorporationof Railroads (1917) 5 Ctmw. L. REV.
273; Bunn, Federal Incorporationof Railway Companies (1917) 30 HAgv. L. REv.

589; Watkdns, Federalization of Corporations (1935) 13 TENN. L. REv. 89.
For a criticism of the chartering by Congress of various specific organizations,
see, Jameson, Incorporation by the United States (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 624.
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operated. 0 In any event, such a general incorporation law should be
carefully drawn so as to cover all the phases of creation, operation,
and liquidation of government corporations. The legal rules pertaining to them should be simplified and codified. The status of the corporation in the governmental field should be fixed. The extent to
which it is to partake of governmental privileges and immunites should
be established, and at the same time its private corporate character as a
separate entity should be settled.
Certainly, a codified set of rules for the creation and operation of
federally owned corporations is feasible and advisable. The corporate
form of administration has shown itself to be useful, and present indications are that their use will be continued, if not expanded, in the
future. Both the "practical" and "psychological" advantages of a corporation could be retained, and at the same time the creation and conduct of and rules pertaining to government corporations could be simplified and unified.
III
Among the first questions which arise in connection with government owned corporations is one concerning their status in the courts.
There have been numerous cases setting forth rules to govern suits involving such corporations, and they touch upon varied points of practice and procedure.
That government owned corporations are subject to suit was established 'bythe Supreme Court in Sloan Shipyards Corp. v.U. S. S. B.
31
Emergency Fleet Corporation.
The case involved actions against
the Fleet Corporation for tort and for breach of contract, which were
defended on the ground that they were-suits against the United States
involving more than $10,000 and were cognizable only in the Court
of Claims. The Court refused to clothe the Corporation with the
government's immunity from suit and said that even though the Fleet
Corporation was an instrumentality of the government, acted as an
agent of the United States, and was owned by the government, it was
nevertheless answerable for its acts and bound by its contracts and
suable in a court of competent jurisdiction like any private individual
or corporation.3 2 This rule has been reaffirmed in numerous cases
'°This has been proposed by Field, Government Corporations: A Proposal
(1935) 48 HARv. L. RE. 775. This article presents the reasons why a general
incorporation law for government owned corporations is advisable. It also suggests and explains in detail the various features which should be covered by such

a statute.
"258 U. S. 549, 42 Sup. Ct. 386, 66 L. ed. 762 (1922), petition for rehearing
granted, 42 Sup. Ct. 588 (1922). Notes (1922) 36 Hagv. L. REv. 218; (1923) 32
YALE L. J. 283; (1924) 8 Mim. L. REv. 426.
"See also, U. S. S. B. M. F. C. v. Harwood, 281 U. S.519, 50 Sup. Ct. 372,
74 L. ed. 1011 (1930), holding the Fleet Corporation subject to suit and liable
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involving the Fleet Corporation, and in a few cases involving some
of the other government owned corporations, and in view" of their language is probably equally applicable to all the government owned cor33
porations.
That some of the corporations presently operating may sue and be
sued in the corporate name is definitely settled by statute. The charon contracts executed by it in its own name even though the Corporation acted
for the United States as known principal.
'Among the cases in which the suability of a government owned corporation
has been asserted are: Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. Landis, 261 Fed. 440 (E. D.
Pa. 1919) ; Gould Coupler Co. v. U. S. S. B. E. F. C., 261 Fed. 716 (S. D. N. Y.
1919); McComb v. U. S. Housing Corp., 264 Fed. 589 (D. C. Del. 1920); Lord
and Burnham Co. v. U. S. S. B. E. F. C., 265 Fed. 955 (N. D. Ill. 1920) ; Perna
v. U. S. S. B. E. F. C., 266 Fed. 896 (E. D. Pa. 1920); Banque-Russo AsiatiqueLondon v. U. S. S. B. E. F. C., 266 Fed. 897 (E. D. Pa. 1920) ; Ingrain Day Lumber Co. v. U. S. S. B. E. F. C., 267 Fed. 283 (S. D. Miss. 1920); Federal Sugar
Refining Co. v. U. S. Sugar Equalization Board, Inc., 268 Fed. 575 (S. D. N. Y.
1920); Pope v. U. S. S. B. E. F. C., 269 Fed. 319 (S. D. Fla. 1920); American
Cotton Oil Co. v. U. S. S. B. E. F. C., 270 Fed. 296 (E. D. La. 1921); Eichberg
v. U. S. S. B. E. F. C., 273 Fed. 886 (C. of A., D. of C. 1921); Traylor Engineering and Manufacturing Co. v. U. S. S. B. E. F. C., 277 Fed. 248 (E. D.
Pa. 1922); Buffalo Union Furnace Co. v. U. S. S. B. E. F. C., 283 Fed. 673
(W. D. N. Y. 1922), aff'& 291 Fed. 23 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1923), writ of error dis-

missed, 268 U. S. 707, 45 Sup. Ct. 510, 69 L. ed. 1168 (1925); John G. Wright
and Co. v. U. S. S. B. E. F. C., 285 Fed. 647 (S. D. N. Y. 1922); Atlantic Corp.
v. U. S. S. B. E. F. C., 286 Fed. 222 (D. C. N. H. 1923); Puget Sound Machinery

Depot v. U. S. S. B. E. F. C., 293 Fed. 768 (W. D. Wash. 1923); Providence

Engineering Corp. v. Downey Shipbuilding Corp., 294 Fed. 641 (C. C. A. 2nd,
1923); Stewart v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 7 F. (2d) 676
(E. D. N. Y. 1925); U. S. S. B. E. F. C. v. Texas Star Flour Mills, 12
F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926); Cohn v. U. S. S. B., 20 F. (2d) 56 (C. C. A.
6th, 1927) ; U. S. S. B. E. F. C. v. Tabas, 22 F. (2d) 398 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1927) ;
U. S. v. Skinner and Eddy Corp., 28 F. (2d) 373 (W. D. Wash. 1928); Lindgren v. U. S. S. B. M. F. C., 55 F. (2d) 117 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932); U. S. v.
Brown, 247 N. Y. 211, 160 N. E. 13 (1928); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. U. S. S. B.
E. F. C., 187 N. Y. Supp. 695 (1921); Cox v. Sykes Bros., 237 N. Y. 376, 143
N. E. 227 (1924), aff'g 204 App. Div. 442, 198 N. Y. Supp. 178 (1923) which
a.ff'd. 189 N. Y. Supp.268 (1921).
Ballaine v. Alaska Northern Ry. Co., 259 Fed. 183 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919) and
Keeley v. Kerr, 270 Fed. 874 (D. C. Ore. 1921) are to the contrary, but they
are evidently overruled sub siletio by subsequent decisions. See, post pp. 17-21
and notes.
For a discussion and comparison of some of the cases, with a survey of the
theories under which the government owned corporations have been held subject to suit, see Note (1929) 27 MicHr. L. Rxv. 786.
This is only a partial list of cases holding that a government owned corporation is subject to suit. There are also numerous cases in which suit has been
permitted against various federal corporations, but the question of suability has
not been discussed. Some of these cases, which have been disposed of according to general principles of law, are U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corp.
v. Bank Line Transport & Trading Co., 22 F. (2d) 430 (N. D. Cal, 1927)
(libel dismissed for want of prosecution by plaintiff, Fleet Corporation) ; The
Helen Fairlamb, 271 Fed. 507 (E. D. Pa. 1921) (libel for collision) ; Gowanus
Storage Company v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 271 Fed. 528
(E. D. N. Y. 1921) (libel against Fleet Corporation for damages) ; The Monongahela, 282 Fed. 17 (C. C. A. 9th, 1922) (libel for collision, Fleet Corporation,
defendant) ; The Mascot, 282 Fed. 766 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1922) (libel for collision,
Fleet Corporation, defendant); Groton Iron Works v. U. S. S. B. Emergency
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ters granted by Congress to the Inland Waterways Corporation,8 4
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 35 the Tennessee Valley Authority,80 the Home Owners Loan Corporation,3 7 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 38 the Federal Farm Mortgage Corpora40
tion, 39 and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation,
each contain a section so providing. Similarly, the statutes under
which the state chartered corporations are organized provide that corporations organized pursuant to such state laws shall be capable of
suing and being sued.4 1
Thus, the single question of liability to suit of government owned
corporations is settled by the Congressional charters, the state incorporation laws, and the decisions in the Sloan Shipyards and subsequent
cases.
A similar problem concerning corporations owned by foreign governments has been decided the same way. In Code v. Sodct6 Cao5pFleet Corporation, 283 Fed. 812 (D. C. Conn. 1922) (contract Fleet Corporation, defendant) ; W. R. Grace and Co. v. Panama Railroad Company, 285
Fed. 718 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1922); U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation v.
Levensaler, 290 Fed. 297 (C. of A., D. of C., 1923) (action for breach of
contract, Fleet Corporation, defendant); McCall v. IJ. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet
Corporation, 294 Fed. 989 (W. D. Wash. 1924) (libel for wages, Fleet Corporation, defendant); Virginia Bridge and Iron Co. v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet
Corporation, 300 Fed. 249 (D. C. Ala. 1924) (procedure question, Fleet Corporation, defendant); Sanday v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 1 F.

(2d) 390 (S. D. N. Y. 1924), aff'd, 6 F. (2d) 384 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1925), cert.

denied, 269 U. S. 556, 46 Sup. Ct. 19, 70 L. ed. 409 (1925) (charter party action, Fleet Corporation, defendant); Gonzales v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet
Corporation, 3 F. (2d) 168 (E. D. N. Y. 1924) (tort for injuries, Fleet Corporation, defendant) ; American Manufacturing Co. v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet
Corporation, 7 F. (2d) 565 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1925) (contract, Fleet Corporation,

defendant) ; Thompson and Daley v. Panama Railroad Company, 5 F. (2d) 957
(C. C. A. 5th, 1925); R. B. Doak and Co. v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet
Corporation, 11 F. (2d) 523 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926) (contract, Fleet Corporation, defendant); U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Turner, 11 F.
(2d) 921 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926) (contract, Fleet Corporation, defendant); Callister v. U. S. S. B. Merchant Fleet Corporation, 21 F. (2d) 447 (E. D. N. Y.
1927) (libel, Fleet Corporation, defendant); The Carlton, 48 F. (2d) 193
(C. C. A. 5th, 1931) (libel, Fleet Corporation, defendant); Inland Waterways
Corporation v. Hallet and Carey Co., 52 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931) ; Goltra v.
Inland Waterways Corporation, 49 F. (2d) 497 (C. of A., D. of C., 1931);
Inland Waterways Corporation v. Standard Commercial Tobacco Company, 65 F.
(2d) 715 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) ; Richmond Fairfield Railway Co. v. United States
Housing Corporation, 72 F. (2d) 78 (C. of A., D. of C., 1934) (action for
breach of covenant against the Housing Corporation).
" Act of June 3, 1924, 43 STAT. 360 (1924), 49 U. S. C. A. §151 (1929).
"Act of Jan. 22, 1932, 47 STAT. 5 (1932), 15 U. S. C. A. §601 (1935).
'Act of May 18, 1933,48 STAT. 58 (1933), 16 U. S. C. A. §831 (1935).
'Act of June 13, 1933, 48 STAT. 128 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. §§1461 et. seq.

(1935).
2348 STAT. 168 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. §264 (1935).
'Act of Jan. 31, 1934, 48 STAT. 344 (1934), 12 U. S. C. A. §1020 (1935).
'Act of June 27, 1934, 48 STAT. 1246, 1255 (1934).
,u DEL. REv.CODE (1915) c- 65, §2; D. C. CoDE: (1929) tit. 5, §263; TENN. ANN.
CoDE (Williams, 1934) §3722.
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erative Suisse des Charbons410 the court held that a corporation chartered by the Swiss government and partially owned and controlled by
it was subject to suit for breach of contract. The court said that such
corporation was a separate entity and could not plead governmental
immunity. In United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat4lb it was held
that the United States could maintain a suit to enjoin violation of the
anti-trust laws against a corporation organized under the general corporation laws of France, eleven-fifteenths owned by the French Government, and engaged in selling potash for both the French Government and private interests. The court held that the corporation was
a separate entity distinct from its stockholders and that this suit was
41 °
not against a sovereign state but against a private corporation.
In a case involving the Amtorg Trading Corporation, which is a
New York corporation operated and entirely owned by the Soviet
Government, it was alleged that since the United States had not then
recognized the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics the corporation had
no standing in court.41d The court, however, refused to pierce the
corporate veil and said that the Amtorg Corporation was a citizen of
New York entitled to appear in the courts of the United States and
that the court was not concerned with the ownership of its stock or
the residence of its stockholders. The court said that the corporation,
even though owned by the government, did not take on the character
of a sovereign and that consequently, even though the unrecognized
Soviet government could not sue in American courts, 41 the Corpora41
tion owned and operated by it could appear and sue. 1
The distinct entity theory was also applied to a corporation owned
by the Brazilian government. In In re Companhia de Navegacao
Lloyd Brasileiro,4 19 the corporation was petitioning for limitation of li' 21 F. (2d) 180 (S. D. N. Y. 1927) ; Note (1928) 26 MicHr. L. REv. 333.
aT31 F. (2d) 199 (S. D. N. Y. 1929); Notes (1929) 42 HARv. L. REV. 1078;

(1930) 28 Micr. L. Rl v. 457.

41 See, Hervey, The Immunity of Foreign States When Engaged in Commercial Enterprises: A Proposed Solution (1929) 27 MIcH. L. Rzv. 751. See also,
(Note) Government Corporations: Legal Statue of the Canadian National Railway and Subsidiaries (1935) 3 GEo. WAsr. L. REV. 455.
1 "Amtorg Trading Corporation v. United States, 71 F. (2d) 524 (Ct. of
Cust & Pat. App. 1934), rev'g U. S. Cust. Ct., Reap. Dec. 2668 (1931). See also,
Amtorg Trading Corporation v. N. Y. Indemnity Co., 256 N. Y. 671, 177 N. E.
187 (1931) (mem. dec.), affg 242 N. Y. Supp. 811 (1930) (mem. dec.) and
Amtorg Trading Corporation v. Comm. of Int. Rev., 65 F. (2d) 583 (C, C. A.
2nd, 1933) which permitted suits by the Amtorg Corporation but did not raise
the question of its standing in court.
"'See, The Penza, 277 Fed. 91 (E. D. N. Y. 1921); Soviet Republic v.
Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259 (1923), aff'g. 201 App. Div. 888, 193 N. Y.
Supp. 952 (1922). See also, The Sapphire, 78 U. S. 164, 20 L. ed. 127 (1871).
"u See, (Note) Immunity of Soviet State-Ozuned Property from .Tdicial Process (1924) 3 Gzo. WAsH. L. Rv. 65.
7 F. (2d) 235, 238 (E. D. La. 1925).
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ability and opposing a motion for a dedimus potestam for the taking of
testimony in Vera Cruz by written interrogatories. The court said that
the fact that the petitioner in the case was a corporation owned by the
government of Brazil, and its officers were officers of that government
did not clothe the corporation with the character of a sovereign, and that
the corporation had standing in court as a private litigant.
In Molina v. Comision Reguladora Del Mercado de Henequen,41"
a corporation created by the State of Yucatan, Mexico, to assist in
carrying out its policies concerning the growth and sale of hemp was
held subject to suit in New Jersey. The decision was upon two
grounds: one, that the corporation was a separate entity and did not
have the immunity from suit granted to a foreign sovereign, and, second, that even if the corporation were the same as the State, the State
of Yucatan was only a member of the federated state of Mexico and
was not such a sovereign state as is immune from the jurisdiction
41
of the courts of another sovereign. 1
But after suability is settled, questions as to liability arise.
A corollary of the axiom that the federal government may not be
sued except with its consent is that the government is immune from
tort liability. There are two primary theories for this doctrine: one,
that the State-the King under common law-can do no wrong; the
other, that since the government is exempt from suit and since it has
not consented to be sued for torts, there can 'be no tort committed by
the United States. However, the agent of the government, if he or
42
it commits a wrong, is answerable for those wrongful acts.
Do corporations, organized, operated, and entirely owned by the
federal government, share the government's immunity from tort liability? Or, are they to be considered as separate entities liable for
their misdeeds?
These questions seem to have first arisen in the case of Panama
Railroad Company v. Curran.43 A Mrs. Curran sued the Panama
Railroad for damages claimed to have resulted ftom injuries sustained
by her in consequence of the defendant's alleged negligence in permitting the floor of a commissary operated by it to be in a dangerously
slippery condition. The suit was defended on the ground, among oth91 X. J. L. 382, 103 At. 397 (1918).
See also, Kungliz Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., 32 F.
(2d) 195 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1929).
'4 The origin, development, and application of the doctrine of governmental
immunity from tort claims is thoroughly discussed in Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924-1927) 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129, 229, 36 YA= L. J. 1, 757, 1039.
See also, McGuire, Tort ClainaAgainst the U. S. (1931) 19 GEoaRGrowN L. REv.
133.' 256 Fed. 768 CC. C. A. 5th, 1919).
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ers, that the Railroad was a corporate entity all of whose stock was
owned by the United States and that it was acting in the place of
the government and therefore was not liable for torts. The court, in
holding the defendant liable, adhered to the theory that a corporation
is an entity distinct from its stockholders and said that "from the fact
that one owns all the stock of a private corporation it does not follow
that the acts of the corporation are to be treated, not as its acts, but
as the acts of its sole stockholders." The court relied on the early case
44
of The Bank of the United States v. The Planters' Bank of Georgia
as its authority. This case involved a bank in which the state of
Georgia was a shareholder and which was trying to clothe itself with
the sovereignty of the State. However, the Supreme Court, with
Chief Justice Marshall writing the opinion, held that it was a distinct entity and partook of none of the characteristics of its stockholder. The court said: "It is, we think, a sound principle, that when
a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests
itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its
sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of
communicating to the company its privileges and prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes
the character which belongs to its associates, and to the business which
is to be transacted." 45 These principles were applied in the Curran
case as being in point even where the federal government was involved.
Both before and after the Curran case, there were cases in the
Supreme Court and other federal courts holding the Panama Railroad
liable for torts committed by it, but in which the corporation had made
no claim of sovereign immunity and its governmental aspect was not
46
presented or discussed.
An opposite view to that set forth in the Curran decision was taken
"22 U. S.904, 6 L. ed. 244 (1824).

"22 U. S. 904, 907, 6 L. ed. 244, 244 (1824).

See also, Bank of Kentucky v.

Wister 27 U. S. 318, 7 L. ed. 437 (1829).

' Panama Railroad Company v. Bosse, 249 U. S. 41, 39 Sup. Ct. 211, 63 L. ed.
466 (1919), aff'g 239 Fed. 303 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917) ; Panama Railroad Company
v. Toppin, 252 U. S.308, 40 Sup. Ct. 319, 64 L. ed. 582 (1920), aff'g 250 Fed.
989 (C. C. A. 5th, 1918) ; Panama Railroad Company v. Pigott, 254 U. S. 552,
41 Sup. Ct. 199, 65 L. ed. 400 (1921), aff'g 256 Fed. 837 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919);
Panama Railroad Company v. Beckford, 231 Fed. 436 (C. C. A. 5th, 1916);
Panama Railroad Company v. Robert, 256 Fed. 773 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919); Pan-

ama Railroad Company v. Rock, 272 Fed. 649 (C. C. A. 5th, 1921).

See also, Panama Railroad Company v. Strobal, 282 Fed. 52 (C. C. A. 5th,

1922).

Similarly, Pacific Mail Steamship Company v. Panama Railroad Company,

251 Fed. 449 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1918), cert. denicd, 248 U. S.567, 39 Sup. Ct. 9, 63
L. ed. 424 (1918), involved a tort claim against the corporation. The railroad was
held not liable as a matter of law on the facts of the case, with no claim or mention being made of possible immunity as a governmental instrumentality.
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by the court in the case of Ballaine v. Alaska Northern Railway Company.47 This was an action for malicious prosecution which was defended mainly upon the ground that the United States owned the
Railroad. The court held that in acquiring the stocks and bonds and
property of the Railroad, the United States acted in its sovereign
capacity, and in exercising entire control, possession, ownership, and
management, the government had merely employed the corporate organization as an agency through which to execute the purposes of the
statutes authorizing purchase, construction, and operation of railroads
in Alaska. The court also said that if this action were allowed and
the plaintiff recovered, an execution issued against the railroad and its
property attached would produce a situation in which there was "a
judgment creditor interfering with the property owned by the United
States, held, it is true, in the name of the railroad company, yet so
held for the account of the United States by and through an agency
in the form of a corporation."
The only case concurring in the view of the Ballaine case is Keeley
v. Kerr.48 The case, holding that the Emergency Fleet Corporation
was not subject to suit for a tort committed by its agent, was decided
by a district court in Oregon upon the authority of the Ballaine case
49
which had been decided in that circuit.
Before the Supreme Court finally passed upon the question of
whether or not a government owned corporation was immune from
tort liability, three other cases arose in which liability was imposed
even though the United States was the sole stockholder of the defendant corporation.
A district court in Louisiana held in the case of American Cotton
50
Oil Company v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation
that the
Fleet Corporation, although entirely owned by the federal government,
could be sued at law for a tort. A similar decision was rendered in
PanamaRailroad Company v. Minnix.5 1
Federal Sugar Refining Company v. United States Sugar Equaliza'259 Fed. 183 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919), aff'g 5 Alaska 694 (1917) ; Notes (1920)
20 COL. L. Rzv. 217; 8 A. L. R. 995.
's270 Fed. 874 (D.C. Ore. 1921).
" The case of Sloan Shipyards Corporation v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet
Corporation, 268 Fed. 624 (W. D. Wash. 1920) when decided in the lower court
followed the Ballaine case but was later reversed by the Supreme Court.
(0270 Fed. 296 (E. D. La. 1921).
282 Fed. 47 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922). In McComb v. U. S. Housing Corp., 264
Fed. 589 (D. C. Del. 1920), when the Housing Corporation allegedly acted in excess and abuse of its lawful authority in connection with the requisition of land,
the court, without especially discussing the liability of the Corporation to tort
actions, held that an action to redress injuries caused by the unauthorized act was
not a suit against the government and could be maintained against the corporation.
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tion Board, Incorporated52 involved a tort committed by a government
owned corporation which had been organized under the laws of Delaware as a part of the government's war-time Food Administration. 8
The court held that this was a private corporation chartered by the
state of Delaware and governed by its general corporation laws, among
which are powers for a corporation to sue and be sued. The fact that
the government owned all the stock and, through government officials,
operated the company was not deemed sufficient to give the corporation sovereign character. The court said that the federal government,
when using a private corporation, had to take it as it was and with
whatever rights and liabilities the law of the chartering state might
impose upon it. The Planters' Bank case was used -by the court to
sustain its holdings. The Ballaine case was distinguished on the
ground that it was decided on the special facts of the case involving
an Act of Congress directing the acquisition of railroads which was
carried out by using a corporate organization as an agency of the
government.
This question of corporate liability for tort when all the stock is
owned by the government first came directly before the Supreme Court
in Sloan Shipyards Corporation v. United States Shipping Board
Emergency Fleet Corporation.54 This suit was against the Fleet Corporation for wrongful action by it in connection with certain property
belonging to the plaintiff. The district court had dismissed the action
on the ground that the Fleet Corporation was an instrumentality of the
government and that a suit against it was a suit against the United
States which could not be held liable in tort.n5
The Supreme Court, however, held that the Fleet Corporation was
an agent of the United States created to perform certain functions,
but that nevertheless, the agent, merely because it was such, could
not escape answering for its wrongful acts. The court looked to its
incorporation under the general corporation laws of the District of
Columbia which permitted it to sue and be sued and said that the fact
that the United States owned all the stock did not affect the legal
position of the company. The court held strictly to the theory of a
distinct corporate entity and refused to give the corporation the cloak
of the government's immunity. Mr. Chief Justice Taft wrote a dissenting opinion in which he claimed that the acts of the Corporation
-268 Fed. 575 (D. C. N. Y. 1920).
See, VAN DoRN, GOVER.NMENT OWNED CORPORATIONS (1926) 170-197.
258 U. S. 549, 42 Sup. Ct. 386, 66 L. ed. 762 (1922); Notes (1922) 36
-Av. L. Rrv. 218, (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 282.
'Sloan Shipyards Corporation v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation,
268 Fed. 624 (W. D. Wash. 1920), reargument, 272 Fed. 132 (W. D. Wash. 1921).
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were acts of the government itself and that there could be no liability
imposed except as might be permitted by statute.
Since the Sloan Shipyards case, there have been numerous cases
holding the Fleet Corporation and the Panama Railroad Company liable in tort. Some of the decisions have discussed the claim of sovereign immunity by the Corporations, 5 while others have imposed
liability according to the facts and law of the case with no discussion
57
of the governmental character of the Corporations.
The tenor of the cases indicates that tort claims against any of the
present day corporations will probably be' allowed. And, even though
the cases so far decided have involved only corporations chartered in
a state or the District of Columbia, there is no indication that any distinction should be made between the several corporations because of the
various methods used in chartering them.
The Sloan Shipyards case 58 held that the Fleet Corporation could
be sued for and was liable for a breach of contract. In U. S. S. B.
Merchant Fleet Corporation v. Harwood,59 the Fleet Corporation defended a breach of contract action on the ground that it was acting as
agent for the government and therefore was not personally liable on
the contract. The Supreme Court disregarded this defense and held
that the Fleet Corporation was liable on contracts executed by it in its
own name even though the Corporation was acting as the known agent
of the government.6 0 These two cases clearly indicate the liability of
" 50 S. C.207, 74 L. ed. 686 (1930) aff'g 28 F. (2d) 725 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928) ;
Lindgren v. U. S., 281 U. S. 38, 50 S. Ct. 207, 74 L. ed. 686 (1930) ; U. S. S. B.
Emergency Fleet Corporation v. O'Shea, 5 F. (2d) 123 (C. of A., D. of C. 1925) ;

Wallace v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 5 F. (2d) 234 (W. D.
Wash. 1925); Cohn v. United States Shipping Board, 20 F. (2d) 56 (C. C. A.
6th, 1927). See also, Lindgren v. U. S. S. B. Merchant Fleet Corporation, 55 F.
(2d) 117 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932), cert. denied, 286 U. S. 542, 52 Sup. Ct. 499, 76 L. ed.
1280 (1932).
'Panama Railroad Company v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 44 Sup. Ct. 391, 68
L. ed. 748 (1924), aff'g 289 Fed. 964 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1923); The Allianca 290
Fed. 450 (E. D. Va. 1923); Shea v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation,
202 N. Y. Supp. 809 (1924) ; Theoktistou v. Panama Railroad Company, 6 F. (2d)
116 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925), cert. denied, 269 U. S. 569, 46 Sup. Ct. 25, 70 L. ed.
416 (1925) ; Zinnel v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 10 F. (2d) 47
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1925); United States Shipping Board v. Greenwald, 16 F. (2d)
948 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1927); Howarth v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 24 F. (2d) 374 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1928). See also, Grant v. U. S. S. B.
Emergency Fleet Corporation, 22 F. (2d) 488 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1927).
'Supra note 31.
1281 U. S. 519, 50 Sup. Ct. 372, 74 L. ed. 1011 (1930), aff'g 32 F. (2d) 680
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1929) which reversed 26 F. (2d) 116 (D. C. Conn. 1928).
See also, U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation v. South Atlantic Dry
Dock Co., 300 Fed. 56 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924) which held that the Fleet Corporation was liable on contracts made by it for work on ships in its possession and
operated by it even though the ships were owned by the United States and the
other party knew it; Dietrich v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 9 F.
(2d) 733 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1925). Smith v. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 26 F.

258

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

a government owned corporation upon a contract entered into by it.01
Not only may a government owned corporation sue and be sued,
but in certain instances it has been held that the United States is a
proper party plaintiff in suits involving government corporations.
The United States was permitted to enjoin the collection of taxes
levied against the Emergency Fleet Corporation, 62 the Spruce Production Corporation, 3 and the United States Housing Corporation0 4
although the question of whether the government was a proper party
was not raised. In these cases, the taxes levied upon the corporations
Were held invalid because they were declared to be in effect taxes
upon the property of the United States; evidently it was assumed that
the United States was a proper party because of its interest in the property and the result.
In an action brought by the United States and the Spruce Production Corporation to recover damages for breach of a contract between
the Corporation and the defendant, it was held that the United States
was a proper party plaintiff. The court said that the government was
seeking to enforce a right in which it had a real and substantial interest and consequently could join in a suit by a corporation owned by it.05
In a suit to quiet title to property requisitioned by the Housing
Corporation, the United States was held to be the real party in interest
and entitled to maintain the action.00
(2d) 337 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1928) which held the Fleet Corporation not relieved of
liability for damages caused to cargo by deviation (in violation of the shipping contract) even though it defended on the ground of agency for the United
States. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Tabas, 22 F. (2d) 398
(C. C. A. 3rd, 1927).
'There are two cases before the Harwood case which are to the contrary.
Astoria Marine Iron Works v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 295
Fed. 415 (D. C. Ore. 1924) held that the Fleet Corporation was not personally
liable on a contract for ship construction made as authorized agent of the President and where the contract expressly recited that the Corporation, as agent,
represented the United States, as owner, and that the work was to be done for
and paid for by the owner. W. P. Tanner-Gross Go. v. James W. Elwell & Co.,
2 F. (2d) 396 (S. D. N. Y. 1924) held that the Fleet Corporation was not personally liable on a contract made by it as disclosed agent of the United States.
More recently, Galveston Dry Dock & Construction Co. v. U. S., 7 F. Supp.
460 (S. D. Tex. 1934) held that the Merchant Fleet Corporation was not liable
on a contract executed by it as agent for the Shipping Board for repairs to a
vessel of the Shipping Board. See also, id., 13 F. (2d) 608 (C. 1C. A. 5th,
1926) ; id., 31 F. (2d) 247 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929).
' U. S. v. Coghlan, 261 Fed. 425 (D. C. Md. 1919).
'U. S. v. Clallam County, Wash., 283 Fed. 645 (W. D. Wash. 1922), aff'd,
263 U. S. 341, 44 Sup. Ct. 121, 68 L. ed. 328 (1923).
0 City of New Brunswick v. U. S. 276 U. S. 547, 48 Sup. Ct. 371, 72 L. ed. 693
(1928), re7Ig 11 F. (2d) 476 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1926), which rev'd 1 F. (2) 741
(D. C. N. J. 1924).
' Erickson v. U. S., 264 U. S. 246, 44 Sup. Ct. 310, 68 L. ed. 661 (1924),
1U. S. v. Stein, 48 F. (2d) 626 (N. D. Ohio 1921).
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In an action by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation upon a
promissory note obtained by it in consequence of a purchase of the assets of a defunct bank, the United States was permitted to intervene
as a party plaintiff and prosecute the action. The court'held that the
Corporation was acting merely as a representative of the United States
and functioning as an agency of the government and that consequently
the United States, as principal, could properly join with its agent in
bringing any action for the conservation of the government's rights
or to recover moneys due to its agents. 66'
In some of the cases concerning the Fleet Corporation, the courts
also said that the Corporation was acting only as the agent of the government and not in its corporate capacity and that the United States,
as principal, could bring suit. Thus, an action to recover overpayment
by the Fleet Corporation on a contract for propellors, 67 and suits in admiralty to recover under charter parties entered into by the Fleet Corporation 68 were sustained when brought -by the United States alone.69
On the other hand, the United States was held not to be the real
party in interest in a suit to foreclose mortgages given to the Fleet
Corporation, "representing the United States of America." The court
there held that the Fleet Corporation was acting as a separate corporate entity and not as agent of the United States. 7 0
In United States v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.,71 the court refused to permit suit by the United States, as principal, on a contract
of the Fleet Corporation because the instrument in suit was under seal
and only named parties to a sealed instrument could bring suit on it.
However, in another action on the same surety contract, the United
States was permitted to sue as assignee and to allege defaults suf72
fered by it as principal.
In an action against the government to recover excess income
03 Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Krauss, 12 F. Supp. 44 (D. C. N. J.
1935).
' Russell Wheel and Foundry Co. v. U. S., 31 F. (2d) 826 (C. C. A. 6th,

1929), aff'g 11 F. (2d) 531 (E. D. Mich. 1926).

"U. S. v. Courtright-Dinmick Co., 28 F. (2d) 142 (E. D. Pa. 1928) (libel
to recover demurrage for a delay in loading a vessel of the Fleet Corporation) ;
U. S. v. Gano-Moore Co., 35 F. (2d) 395 (E. D. Pa. 1929) (libel to recover
excess of dispatch moneys retained by the defendant improperly and not due
because of delay in loading); U. S. v. Czarnikow-Rionda, 40 F. (2d) 214
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1930) (libel to recover demurrage defendant agreed to pay to
Fleet Corporation) ; The Lake Galera, 60 F. (2d) 876 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1932).
Contra: U. S. v. Mathews, 282 Fed. 266 (C. C. A. 9th, 1922).
0Providence Engineering Corp. v. Downey Shipbuilding Corp., 294 Fed. 641
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1923).

-52 F. (2d) 148 (S. D. N. Y. 1931).

U. S. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 55 F. (2d) 377 (S. D. N. Y. 1932).

See also, New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. U. S., 16 F. (2d) 847 (C. C. A. 4th,
1927).
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taxes paid, the United States was permitted to maintain a counterclaim
on a bond given to the Fleet Corporation, the government claiming
both as principal and assignee of the instrument.7" Similarly, in a suit
'by the United States to recover overpayments to the defendant by the
Fleet Corporation on a series of war-time contracts, the defendant was
permitted to use as set-offs claims it had against the Fleet Corporation,
but the court held that no judgment could be given against the United
74
States for the defendant's excess claims.
75
The defense of laches and the statute of limitations70 have been
allowed to defeat an action by the Fleet Corporation, and on this
basis would presumably be good against the other government corporations. However, in an action brought by the United States to recover
demurrage under a charter party entered into by the Fleet Corporation,
the defendant was not allowed to use laches as a defense to defeat the
government's claim. 77 But, in a libel by the United States for damages to a vessel of the Shipping Board, the defendant was allowed to
set up the defense of laches against the government. 7 8 And on the
other hand, a defendant was not permitted to use the statute of limitations to defeat an action brought by the United States to recover overpayment of charter hire made by the Fleet Corporation.7 0
Although the federal statutes forbid the assignment of unliquidated
claims against the United States7) a suit by an assignee of a claim
may be maintained against the United States where the claim was
originally against the Emergency Fleet Corporation, against whom assignments are not forbidden.79b
'Crane v. U. S., 55 F. (2d) 734 (Ct. Cl. 1932). See also, American Shipbuilding Co. v. U. S., 60 Ct. Cl. 1005 (1925). A decision by the ComptrollerGeneral in 1928 held that the United States could set off a debt due the Fleet
Corporation by a bankrupt marine engineering corporation against a claim of
the bankrupt against the United States. 7 Dec. C. G. 576 (1928).
' U. S. v. Skinner and Eddy Corp., 28 F. (2d) 373 (W. D. Wash. 1928).
See also, Skinner and Eddy Corp. v. McCarl, 275 U. S. 1, 48 Sup. Ct. 12, 72
L. ed. 131 (1927); U. S. v. Skinner and Eddy Corp., 5 F. (2d) 708 (W. D.

Wash. 1925),; U. S. v. Skinner and Eddy, 35 F. (2d) 889 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929).
'The No. 34, 11 F. (2d) 287 (D. C. Mass. 1925).
"U. S. v. Brown, 247 N. Y. 211, 160 N. E. 13 (1928) (dictum).
' U. S. v. Czarnikow-Rionda Co., 40 F. (2d) 214 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1930) ; The
Lake Galera, 60 F. (2d) 876 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1930).

But see, U. S. v. Jackson-

ville Forwarding Co., 1925, A. M. C. 958, in which laches was permitted to be
used as a defense to a libel by the United States on the ground that when the
government enters business outside of strict government matters it can allow
its claim
to be barred by laches just as may a private individual.
8
" The No. 34, 11 F. (2d) 287 (D. C. Mass. 1925).

U. S. v. Brown, 247 N. Y. 211, 160 N. E. 13 (1928) (dictum).

7' 35 STAT. 411 (1908), 31 U. S. C. A. §203 (1927).
Providence Engineering Corporation v. Downey Shipbuilding Corporation,

3 F. (2d) 154 (E. D. N. Y. 1924); Charles Nelson Company v. United States,
11 F. (2d) 906 (W. D. Wash. 1926); Rhodes v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 124
(E. D. N. Y. 1934).
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There is a general rule in respect to garnishment that the United
States, or a state, or even a local governmental unit cannot be subjected
80
to liability as a garnishee in a controversy between private litigants.
The tenor of the cases indicates that the Fleet Corporation, and by
analogy the other government owned corporations, would also fall
within this rule. The cases in point are somewhat confused.
The first case involving garnishment of the Fleet Corporation did
not produce a clear decision on the point.8 1 Four actions, the Corporation being garnishee in two of them, were consolidated for trial. The
Corporation moved to dismiss all the actions, and the District Court
denied its motion. The court indicated that upon a trial of the cases
that garnishment of the Corporation would not be permitted where it
was acting as the United States or where its property and assets were
in the actual use of the government. On the other hand, if it were
acting in its capacity as a private corporation, garnishment would be
permitted. Thus, so far as garnishment generally is concerned, the
court did not adopt either view of the Corporation's status but rather
left the situation to be decided by the facts of each case.
In a case in the state courts of Pennsylvania, it was held that the
Fleet Corporation, although it was an agency of the United States
and all its stock was owned by the government, nevertheless had only
the status of any other business corporation and did not take on aspects
82
of sovereignty. Garnishment of the Corporation was permitted.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
has held that the Fleet Corporation, although it may be sued in certain cases like a private corporation, is an instrumentality of the government and cannot be subject to attachment or garnishment in a case
88
involving solely the rights or liabilities of other parties.
A recent case in which the Home Owners Loan Corporation was
summoned as garnishee held that the funds of the Corporation are not
subject to garnishment in an action against a creditor of the Corpora' See, 28 C. J. 55-65.
' Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. Landis, 261 Fed. 440 (E. D. Pa. 1919).
(Emergency Fleet Corporation, garnishee).
'Haines v. Lone Star Shipbuilding Co., 268 Pa. 92, 110 Atl. 788 (1920)
(U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, garnishee) ; 275 Pa. 260, 118 AtI. 909

(1922).

'McCarthy v. U. S. S. B. Merchant Fleet Corporation, 53 F. (2d) 923 (C. of
A., D. of C., 1931), cert. denied, 285 U. S.547, 52 Sup. Ct. 408, 76 L. ed. 938
(1932). In an earlier case, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
held invalid a garnishment proceeding against the Fleet Corporation on the
ground that the debt the plaintiff was seeking to attack was a judgment of a court
of another jurisdiction not attachable in the District of Columbia. The question of immunity of the Fleet Corporation from garnishment was not discussed.
Merchant Fleet Corporation v. Hirsch Lumber Co., 35 F. (2d) 1010 (C. of A.,
D. of C. 1929).
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tion even though the Home Owners Loan Corporation Act provides
that the Corporation may sue and be sued in any court of competent
jurisdiction.8 4 The decision was based upon two grounds. One, that
the Home Owners Loan Corporation is a public corporation owned
by the government and operated by it as an instrumentality of the
United States and therefor not subject to garnishment proceedings
without express statutory provision for them. The other, that the
funds of the Corporation are deposited in the Treasury with the Treasurer of the United States and the rule that moneys in the possession
of the United States are not subject to garnishment is applicable in
this situation.
In the light of these conflicting decisions, it is probable that if
further garnishment cases arise the courts will be likely to adopt the
attitude that the corporations are performing governmental functions
and that they cannot be garnished because such proceedings would interfere with the operations of the government.
Whether or not the property of a government owned corporation
is subject to attachment before or during a suit against it or on execution to enforce a judgment rendered against it is a question which
cannot yet be definitely answered. The Suits in Admiralty Act exempts vessels of the Fleet Corporation from seizure on a libel in rem. 8 5
The same Act also provides that judgments rendered against the United
States or the Fleet Corporation in a libel in personam brought under
the Act shall be paid out of the United States Treasury.80 Thus, this
Act prohibits the seizure in admiralty suits of ships belonging to the
Fleet Corporation and provides a method of payment of judgments
obtained in such suits. But, beyond a few dicta in some of the cases
involving the war-time corporations and a recent decision of the Supreme Court, there are no precedents upon which to base a definite
statement as to the possibility of attaching property of the corporations
generally.
The case of Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. PriddyS8a did permit an attachment against a Federal Land Bank. Although this case
did not involve a typical completely government owned and operated
"Gill v. Reese, U. S. L. Week, April 23, 1935, at 7 (Munic. Ct. of Cleve-

land, Ohio, March 29, 1935).
'Post p. 35-38 and n. 113-121.

" Act of March 9, 1920. c. 95, §8, 41 STAT. 527 (1920), 46 U. S. C. A. §748 (1927).

U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Rosenberg Brothers and Co., 276
U. S. 202, 48 Sup. Ct. 256, 72 L. ed. 531 (1928) ; Johnson v. U. S. S. B. Emer-

gency Fleet Corporation, 280 U. S. 320, 50 Sup. Ct. 118, 74 L. Ed. 451 (1930) ;
Schaefer v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 242 N. Y. Supp. 522
(1930). See also, 27 Dec. Compt. Treas. 987 (1921); 2 Dec. Comipt. Gen. 751
(1923) ; 3 Dec. Compt. Gen. 566 (1924) (a judgment rendered by an English ct.).
s295

U. S. 229, 55 Sup. Ct. 705, 79 L. ed. 1408 (1935).
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corporation, it does furnish an indication that when the situation
does arise the courts may permit an attachment. Federal Land Banks
are privately operated under government supervision and the United
States owns but approximately fifty per cent of their capital stockS1b
This case was an action against the St. Louis Land Bank commenced
by an attachment of the real property of the defendant. The Bank
applied for a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge of the Circuit
Court from proceeding with the trial of the case after he had denied
its motion to vacate the attachment. The Bank argued that it was a
federal instrumentality, immune from mesne process of attachment,
by virtue of its organization and functions under federal statutes.
The application was denied by the Supreme Court of Arkansas. The
United States Supreme Court considered the status of the Land Banks
and placed emphasis upon the fact that even though they are government instrumentalities they have numerous attributes of private corporations. The Court said, "Federal Land Banks were intended to be
subject to the incidents of suit, including attachment and execution.
In creating federal land banks as government instrumentalities, but
with many of the purposes and activities of private corporations, in exempting them alone from taxation, and at the same time subjecting them,
like joint-stock land banks, to suit" as fully as natural persons, "Congress cannot be thought to have intended that either class of banks
should be immune from attachment, and their judgment creditors relegated to a receivership, allowed as a matter of grace, as the sole means
of collecting their judgments. In the present case it does not appear
that the attachment would directly interfere with any function performed by petitioner as a federal instrumentality. We reserve the question whether a different result would be required if such interference
were shown."
United States v. Kinney86 ' was a case involving a proceeding in
which the United States claimed goods which had been levied upon under a judgment rendered against the Fleet Corporation in a suit in which
it was garnishee. A motion of the plaintiff in execution for an order
directing the marshal to sell the goods was granted. The Court evidently assumed that garnishment of the Fleet Corporation with execution on and sale of its property on the garnishment judgment were permissible. The case was decided on procedural points, and the governmental status of the Fleet Corporation was not discussed.
The cases indicate that garnishment proceedings against government
81'See, Pamphlet, Statements of Couition of Federal Land Banks and Fed-

eral Intermediate Credit Banks (Govt. P. 0. 1935) 4, 9.
1*264 Fed. 542 (E. D. Pa. 1920), appeal dismissed, 254 U. S. 663, 41 Sup.
Ct. 64, 65 L. ed. 464 (1920).

264

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

owned corporations will not be allowed when they will affect the operations of the corporation as an agency of the government. Following this rule, it would seem that the courts could refuse to allow property of a corporation to be attached before or during a suit. Tying
up of its property during litigation might be held to hamper the operations of the corporations and to be an interference with governmental
administration. In those instances in which governmental functions
have been involved, the courts have tended to disregard the corporate
entity and to clothe the government owned corporation with its stockholder's privileges. So, a similar course might be pursued in attachment proceedings.
It seems more likely, however, that the courts will follow the cases
permitting suit on a theory of a distinct corporate entity and hold that
the corporations are subject to attachment as well. Since suit may be
brought, there should be no reason why a plaintiff should not be able
to utilize all possible devices in prosecuting his action. Although a
plaintiff would probably have but infrequent occasion to use attachment proceedings in an action against a government owned corporation, it would seem that attachment should be available if necessary.
And, since the courts have held the corporations liable to suit like any
private corporation, it would seem likely that the courts would hold
that all the usual or possible incidents of an action are permitted.
Two cases indicate that this latter theory would be followed if the
question of liability of a government owned corporation to attachment
should arise. A libel in personam with an attachment of the money
of the Fleet Corporation was permitted in U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet
Corporationv. Banque Russo Asiatique, London." A consignee of a
cargo carried by a Fleet Corporation vessel brought the suit to recover demurrage charges it had been forced to pay in order to receive
the cargo. The court held that the libelant was not limited to a libel
in personam against the United States or the Fleet Corporation under
procedure as prescribed by the Suits in Admiralty Act 'but was entitled to begin its action by libel and foreign attachment pursuant to
rule 2 of the Supreme Court Admiralty Rules. And in Harwood v.
8
U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation
s an attachment of property
of the Fleet Corporation pending trial of an action was evidently permitted although the attachment was later dissolved because of certain
provisions of the Connecticut statutes as to attachments in general.
The same two courses are open to the court with respect to levy
and sale of the property of a corporation under execution on a judgment against it. Following the theory that the property of the corporas286 Fed. 918 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1923).
s'300 Fed. 433 (D. C. Conn. 1924).
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tions is more or less the property of the government and that any interference with it would hinder the operations of the government, they
could disregard the corporate entity and declare the corporations' property exempt from execution. The cases involving taxation and garnishment together with the other cases giving the corporations governmental character could be used as a basis for such a decision.
On the other hand, the theory of a distinct corporate entity can be
followed through to this end. Since a corporation may be sued and is
liable for torts and breaches of contract, a successful plaintiff should
be permitted to make whatever judgment is rendered effective by an
execution and sale if necesary. If execution should not be permitted,
the right to sue would be valueless should the corporation refuse to
pay judgments against it. That the courts would be likely to follow
this view if the question arose is indicated by the language used in
some of the decisions involving government corporations.
Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporatlion 8 9 held that the Fleet Corporation was subject to suit. In the
course of the opinion, Mr. Justice Holmes said: "The meaning of incorporation is that you have a person, and as a person one that presumably is subject to the general rules of law."90 Later on, he said:
"The transfer of the property of the Fleet Corporation to the Shipping Board91 . . . may affect the value of the remedy afforded by the
present suit but not the jurisdiction of the Court." This would indicate that he thought that the Corporation's assets were liable in satisfaction of the judgment.
Mr. Chief Justice Taft said in his dissenting opinion in the same
case: "The Court suggests that judgments thus obtained will be good
only against the Fleet Corporation and the claimants must run the risk
of getting a judgment against a debtor which cannot pay. Congress
has taken over all the assets of the Fleet Corporation so that such judgments will be valueless except so far as Congress shall conclude to pay
them."
In United States Grain Corporationv. Phillips92 there is the statement that "it is true that the legal title was in the Corporation, that
the property of the Corporationmight have been taken to pay a judgmwnt against it, and that in other ways the difference of personality
would be recognized."
258 U. S. 549, 42 Sup. Ct. 386, 66 L. ed. 762 (1922).
®Italics here and in immediately following quotations are the writer's.
By the Act of June 5, 1920, c. 250, §4, 41 STAT. 988, 990 (1920), 46 U. S. C. A.

01

§863 (1928).
m261 U. S. 106, 113, 43 Sup. Ct. 283, 286, 67 L. ed. 552, 556 (1923).
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In the case holding the Sugar Equalization Board liable for a tort 8
District Judge Mayer used two sentences from which it might be
inferred that he thought that the Corporation would have to pay
judgments out of the corporate assets and that, if necessary, such
assets might be attached and sold under execution. He said: "But
the incorporation under a state statute [Delaware] of a business corporation cannot deprive the agent thus created of its right as a corporation to make a profit nor relieve it of its corporate liabilities....
The
property of the corporation cannot become the property of the stockholders until all provable claims are liquidated, no matter what the purpose of the stockholder may be, and the government's position as a
stockholder is no different from that of a sovereign state which is a
stockholder."
District Judge Foster in American Cotton Oil Co. v. U. S. S. B.
Emergency Fleet Corporation 4 raised the question of execution by
saying: "There is no good reason why the corporation should not be
sued for damages arising for tort as well as from breach of contract.
The question may arise as to whether or not the property of the corporation may be seized and sold to satisfy a judgment, but there is no
need to consider that in connection with the exception in this case.
After the plaintiff has established his claim, if he does so, there will
be time enough to consider the method of collection."
In only one case has there been a direct statement on the point, and
then it was merely dictum. The Panama Railroad was sued for damages caused by its negligence in the case of Panama Railroad Company
v. Minnix.95 In holding the Company liable, Circuit Judge King said:
"While the United States is the sole stockholder of that corporation,
the corporate entity of that company is maintained, and the railroad is
operated by the corporation . . . the liability of the Panama Railroad
Company to suit, as any other railroad company, and its property to
seizure, is not affected, by the fact that the United States is the sole
stockholder."
Even in Ballaine v. Alaska Northern Railway Company 0 which
held that the Alaska Railroad, being owned by the government, could
not be sued for a tort, 97 the court suggested that should a judgment
be given against the Railroad, the plaintiff would look to its property
for satisfaction. This was one of the reasons which influenced the
'Federal

Sugar Refining Co. v. U. S. Sugar Equalization Board, Inc., 268

Fed. 575, 586 (S. D. N. Y. 1920).
'270 Fed. 296 (E. D. La. 1921).
0282 Fed. 47, 49 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922).

'*259 Fed. 183 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919).
'This case does not represent the law. See, supra p. 256.
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because such a
court to decide that a tort action could not be brought
97
a
government.
the
with
interfere
result would probably
These questions as to the possibility of attachment and of execution
seem at the present time to be more or less academic. In none of the
cases involving the Fleet Corporation, the Panama Railroad, or the
other government owned corporations have the questions been directly
raised or decided. Nor does it seem likely that they wil arise.
An attachment is generally used when it appears that the defendant
might evade paying any judgment rendered in the suit or when the
defendant has property which can be reached by the plaintiff but is not
readily available for a personal action. Neither of these reasons holds
true for a government corporation.
Execution is used when the defendant fails to pay a judgment rendered against it. As a matter of fact, once a final judgment is given
against a government corporation it is paid and discharged. Although
the corporations resist claims to the utmost, depending upon each individual case, once the matter has been finally determined settlement is
made without further controversy. It has not been, and probably will
not be, necessary for a plaintiff to levy upon the corporations' property and sell it under execution to satisfy his judgment. Since the
passage of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act,98 it would be convenient to sue these corporations in that form of proceeding, for a
judgment, being final, would in all probability be obeyed as faithfully
as any existing judgment taking coercive form.
Another problem in connection with suits involving government
owned corporations concerns the question of the jurisdiction of various courts to entertain the actions. In general, it may be said that the
corporations are treated as separate entities distinct from the government and that the various-rules as to state and federal jurisdiction are
applied in determining in what courts they may sue and be sued.
The federal district courts have jurisdiction of suits by or against
a corporation chartered by Congress where the United States owns
more than one-half of the corporation's capital stock and the amount in
controversy exceeds $3,000, on the ground that such a suit arises under the laws of the United States.9 9 It has also 'been held that ac"aIn a case concerning a corporation partially owned and operated by the
Swiss government, the court, in holding the corporation liable for breach of
contract, added a dicta that "property of the corporation taken on execution would
not be property of the Swiss Federation." Coale v. Socit6 Co6perative Suisse
des Charbons, Basle, 21 F. (2d) 180 (D. C. N. Y. 1921).
'Act of June 14, 1934, 48 STAT. 955, 28 U. S. C. A. §400 (1935).
"Judicial Code §24, 28 U. S. C. A. §41 (1) (1927); Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 1, 5 Sup. Ct. 1113, 29 L. ed. 319 (1884) ; Texas and Pacific
Railway Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593, 12 Sup. Ct. 905, 36 L. ed. 829 (1892) ; Oregon
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tions against the Fleet Corporation are cognizable in the federal courts
regardless of the amount in controversy because such suits arise under
a law regulating commerce.10 0 However, an action at law against the
Fleet Corporation under the Merchant Marine Act for the death of
a seaman is held not removable to the federal courts. This is because
of the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, incorporated
in the Merchant Marine Act, that the state and federal courts shall
have concurrent jurisdiction of such actions and that no case brought
in a competent state court shall be removed to the federal courts. 01
Short Line and Utah Northern Railway Co. v. Skottowe, 162 U. S. 490, 16 Sup.
Ct. 869, 40 L. ed. 1048 (1896); Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v. Cody, 166
U. S. 606, 17 Sup. Ct. 703, 41 L. ed. 1132 (1897); Matter of Dunn, 212 U. S.
374, 29 Sup. Ct. 299, 53 L. ed. 558 (1909) ; Union Timber Products Co. v. U. S.
S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 252 Fed. 320 (W. D. Wash. 1918); American Cotton Oil Co. v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 270 Fed. 296
(E. D. La. 1921) ; Rosenberg v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 271
Fed. 956 (D. C. Ore. 1920); Atlantic Corp. v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet
Corporation, 286 Fed. 222 (D. C. N. H. 1920). In Harry Porter Co., Inc. v.
U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 284 Fed. 397 (S. D. N. Y. 1922), and
Hill v. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 284 Fed. 398 (S. D. N. Y. 1922), it was
held that suits against government corporations chartered by Congress are removable on this ground regardless of the amount in controversy, but Delpit v.
U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 19 F. (2d) 60 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927)
was to the contrary and did not permit removal because the jurisdictional amount
of $3000 was not involved.
-The Act of Feb. 13, 1925, 43 STAT. 941 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. §42, taking
away jurisdiction of the district courts over suits involving a corporation chartered
by Congress where the jurisdictional fact is that the suits arise under the
laws of the United States because of federal incorporation, does not apply
to corporations incorporated by or under an Act of Congress wherein the Government of the United States is the owner of more than half of its capital stock.
See also, U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation v. South Atlantic Dry Dock
Co., 19 F. (2d) 486 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927).
However, Belden v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 3 F. Supp. 809 (W. D. Tex.
1933) held that a suit against the Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of Houston
and other defendants was not removable from a state court to the federal district court even though the bank is chartered and incorporated under an Act
of Congress and its capital stock is owned entirely by the United States Government, although as a plaintiff in a proper case it would have the right to
originally invoke the federal jurisdiction, or as a sole defendant to remove to
the federal court.
'®36 STAT. 1092 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §41 (8) (1927) ; Ingram Day Lumber
Co. v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 267 Fed. 283 (S. D. Miss.
1920) ; Harry Porter Co., Inc. v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 284
Fed. 397 (S. D. N. Y. 1922); Hill v. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 284 Fed. 398
(S. D. N. Y. 1922); James v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 12 F.
(2d) 89 (E. D. Pa. 1926); Katz v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation,
32 F. (2d) 14 (E. D. N. Y. 1929). Contra: Delpit v. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 19 F. (2d) 60 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927).
' Reges v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 299 Fed. 957 (E. D.
N. Y. 1924); see also, Leon v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 286
F. 681 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); Martin v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 1 F. (2d) 603 (S. D. N. Y. 1924); Villard v. U. S. S. B. Emergency
Fleet Corporation, 1 F. (2d) 570 (E. D. N. Y. 1924); Atianza v. U. S. S. B.
Emergency Fleet Corporation, 3 F. (2d) 845 (E. D. N. Y. 1924).
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A corporation chartered by Congress is considered a domestic corporation in each state in which it does business. 10 2 It is not, however,
a citizen of any particular state for the purpose of giving jurisdiction
to the federal courts on the ground of diversity of citizenship.' 03
Those federally owned corporations chartered under the laws of
some states are domestic corporations in the state of incorporation.
And the conclusion would seem to follow that they are citizens of such
state for purposes of jurisdiction in the federal courts on the grounds
of diversity of citizenship when the other requisite jurisdictional facts
are presentlosa
Also, cases involving state chartered corporations would seem within
federal jurisdiction on the ground that they arise under the laws of
the United States. 0 4 Although they are not chartered by Congress,
the corporations are organized pursuant to Executive Order, based
upon a federal statute, in order to carry out federal laws.
In all these instances, the state courts would also have jurisdiction
of suits brought by or against the government owned corporations.' 0 5
The venue of actions to which a government corporation is a party
is probably determined according to the rules set forth governing the
venue of civil suits in the federal courts.' 06 Since the corporations
are treated as private corporations for the purpose of suit and for
jurisdictional purposes, it is logical that they should be similarly treated
as far as concerns venue. A few cases on this point indicate as much.
Leon v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporationr'o7 held that a
" Twin Falls National Bank v. Reed, 44 Idaho 573, 258 Pac. 526 (1927);

In re Cushing's Estate, 40 Misc Rep. 505, 82 N. Y. Supp. 795 (1903) ; Commonwealth v. Texas and Pacific Railroad Co., 98 Pa. St. 90 (1881); Texas and
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Weatherby, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 409, 92 S. W. 58 (1906).
See also, N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act. §7 (7) ; Jacobsen v. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 128 Misc. Rep. 138, 217 N. Y. Supp. 856 (1926).
'Bankers' Trust Co. v. Texas and Pacific Railroad Co., 241 U. S. 295, 36
Sup. Ct. 569, 60 L. ed. 1010 (1916). See also, Texas v. I. C. C., 258 U. S. 158,
42 Sup. Ct. 261, 66 L. ed. 531 (1922) ; Anderson v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty
Co., 8 F. (2d) 428 (S. D. Fla. 1925).
" See, Olson v. U. S. Spruce Production Corp., 267 U. S. 462, 45 Sup. Ct.
357, 69 L. ed. 738 (1925).
"u

See, supra note 99.

Atlantic Corp. v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 286 Fed. 222
(D. C. N. H. 1923); Puget Sound Machinery Depot, 293 Fed. 768 (W. D.
Wash. 1923) (holding that the Fleet Corporation is subject to suit in a state
in which it does business) ; U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Sherman
and Ellis, Inc., 208 Ala. 83, 93 So. 834 (1922); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. U. S. S. B.
Emergency Fleet Corporation, 184 N. Y. Supp. 272 (1920), aft'd, 195 App. Div.
838, 187 N. Y. Supp. 695 (1921) ; Haines v. Lone Star Shipbuilding Co., 275 Pa.
260, 118 Atl. 909 (1922).
Contra: Southern Bridge Co. v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation,
266 Fed. 747 (S. D. Ala. 1920).
i36 STAT. 1101 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §112 and §§113-118 (1927).
i286
Fed. 681 (S. D. N. Y. 1921). See also, Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 44 Sup. Ct. 391, 68 L. ed. 748 (1924).
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suit brought under the Seaman's Act which authorizes a seaman suffering personal injuries to sue at law for damages and provides that
jurisdiction shall be in the court of the district in which the employer
resides or in which his principal office is located' 01 could not be
brought in the New York District Court without a showing that the
principal office of the Fleet Corporation was within that jurisdiction
within the meaning of the statute. And in Caceres v. U. S. S. B.
Emergency Fleet Corporation 08 it was held that the venue of such
an action against the Fleet Corporation is in the District of Columbia,
the principal office of the Corporation. 10 9
The case of Wallace v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation"O
held that the Fleet Corporation is subject to an action at law for injuries to an employee in the district in which it maintained an office
and place of business where it transacted business to bring it within
the purview of the state laws as to doing business within the state.
Service of process in this tort action on the district director of the Fleet
Corporation in charge of its business within the district in which the
suit was brought was sufficient, the defendant 'being a corporate entity
doing business within the state.
Commercial Trust Co. v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation" o8 raised the question of venue of suits against the Fleet Corporation. The court proposed two possibilities. One, that since the Corporation is organized in the District of Columbia and is not a citizen
of any state, it may be sued in no federal court except in the District
of Columbia without its, consent. The other, that the question of
venue coalesces with the Corporation's "presence" and "doing business" in the district in which the suit is brought. The court held, however, that the general appearance of the Corporation waived any defects as to venue and did not apply either rule. Yaselli v. U. S. S. B.
Emergency Fleet CorporationObheld that where the jurisdiction of a
federal court depends on the fact that the cause of action arises under
the laws of the United States, the suit may be brought only in the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant and that the defendant
may raise the question upon a special appearance.
1wa

See, 38

STAT.

1185 (1915), 46 U. S. C. A. §688 (1927).

Fed. 968 (E. D. N. Y. 1924). See also, Panama Railroad Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U. S. 557, 46 Sup. Ct. 596, 70 L. ed. 1085 (1926) ; Wienbroer v. U. S.
S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 299 Fed. 972 (E. D. N. Y. 1924) ; Atianza
"299

v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 3 F. (2d) 845 (E. D. N. Y. 1924).
-'However,
in a case of this kind, objection to jurisdiction on the ground
that the suit is not brought in the district of the employer's residence may be
waived, Mannion v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 9 F. (2d) 894
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1925).
2105 F.
(2d) 234 (W. D. Wash. 1925).
-10848F. (2d) 113 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1931). -b298 Fed. 198 (S. D. N. Y. 1924).

FEDERALLY OWNED CORPORATIONS
The Tennessee Valley Authority Act provides that "the Corporation shall maintain its principal office in the immediate vicinity of Muscle Shoals, Alabama. The Corporation shall be held to be an inhabitant
and resident of the northern judicial district of Alabama within the
meaning of the laws of the United States relating to the venue of
civil suits." '
The residence of the other corporations chartered by
Congress is probably Washington, and of the state chartered corporations presumably at the respective state capitals.
In summary, it may be concluded that state and federal courts have
concurrent jurisdiction of actions by or against the federally owned
corporations. However, in order to confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts, either originally or on removal, the necessary jurisdictional
facts as set out in the Judicial Code"12 must be present. Thus, for
the purpose of determining jurisdiction, as well as suability, the government owned corporations are treated as distinct entities and general
rules are applied.
Suits in admiralty against the Fleet Corporation are in a classification
of their own. Special rules have been set forth by the statutes and decisions.
In 1919, the Supreme Court, construing the Shipping Board Act,
held that a vessel owned by the Fleet Corporation was subject to seizure and attachment by a libel in rem.112 Ordinarily, the ships owned
by the government are immune from seizure, but the Act of 1916 provided that any of the vessels of the Shipping Board while solely employed as merchant vessels should be subject to all laws, regulations,
and liabilities governing merchant vessels, even though the United
States was interested therein as owner, either in whole or in part.1 14
And this Act was construed to permit seizure of vessels requisitioned
and employed through the Fleet Corporation.
This liability to seizure of merchant vessels operated by the government and the Fleet Corporation was regarded as detrimental to
the public interest and was an obstruction to the government's operation of commercial shipping. In 1920, .Congress passed the Suits in
Admiralty Act" x5 to remedy the situation. This provided that no ves"'48 STAT. 63 (1933), 16 U. S. C. A. §831g (a) (1935). Whether this statute
would serve to take the T. V. A. out of the rule that a corporation chartered
by Congress is not a citizen of any particular state for the purpose of jurisdiction
in federal courts on the grounds of diversity of citizenship, quaere? See, supra,
p. 269 and note 103.
136 STAT.1091 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §41 (1927).
'The Lake Monroe,250 U. S. 246, 39 Sup. Ct. 460, 63 L. ed. 962 (1919).
"'Act of Sept. 7, 1916, c. 451, 459, 39 STAT. 730 (1916).
For section, as

amended, see 46 U. S. C. A. §808 (1927).
'" Act of March 9, 1920, 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U. S. C. A. §§741-752 (1927).
The Federal admiralty jurisdiction extends to all waters that are in fact
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sel owned 'by or for or in the possession of the United States or a
corporation completely owned by the government should be subject to
arrest or seizure. Instead, provision was made for a libel in personam
against the corporation or the United States in admiralty proceedings
where a merchant vessel was involved.115 ' The procedure for bringing
suits and for their conduct and for obtaining satisfaction of judgments
is prescribed by the Act.
A number of cases hold that this Act furnishes the exclusive remedy in admiralty against the Fleet Corporation on all maritime causes
of action arising out of its possession or operation of merchant vessels. 110 Nevertheless, there are other cases which hold that the Act
does not apply to all such suits. A libel in personan with an attachment of the money of the Fleet Corporation was brought in U. S. S. B.
1 17
Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Banque Russo Asiatique, London.
It was an action to recover demurrage charges, and the court held
that the libelant was not limited to a libel in personam against the
United States or the Fleet Corporation under procedure as prescribed
by the Act but was entitled to begin its action by libel and foreign
attachment pursuant to Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Admiralty Rules.
Also, in John G. Wright and Company v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet
navigable. The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U. S. 17, 24 Sup. Ct. 8, 48 L. ed. 73
(1903). See also, The Genessee Chief, 53 U. S. 466, 13 L. ed. 1058 (1851) ; The
Montello, 87 U. S. 430, 22 L. ed. 391 (1874) ; It re Garnett, 141 U. S. 1, 8, 11
Sup. Ct. 840, 841, 35 L. ed. 631 (1891); Donnelly v. U. S., 228 U. S. 243, 262,
33 Sup. Ct. 449, 455, 57 L. ed. 820 (1912).
" The Act has been held not to prevent a libel in rem against a ship owned
by the United States when in a foreign port. It does not "authorize a suit in
personam against the United States as a substitute for a libel in rem when the
United States vessel is not in a port of the United States or one of her possessions." Blamberg Bros. -v. U. S., 260 U. S. 452, 43 Sup. Ct. 179, 67 L. ed. 346
(1923).
' U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Rosenberg Bros. and Co.,
276 U. S. 202, 48 Sup. Ct. 256, 72 L. ed. 531 (1928); Johnson v. U. S. S. B.
Emergency Fleet Corporation, 280 U. S. 320, 50 Sup. Ct. 118, 74 L. ed. 451
(1930); Smith v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 26 F. (2d) 337
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1928) ; Royal Insurance Co. v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 30 F. (2d) 946 (S. D. N. Y. 1929); Wenstein v. Black Diamond S. S.
Corp., 40 F. (2d) 590 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1930) ; Independent Casing and Supply Co.
v. Roosevelt S. S. Co., 44 F. (2d) 858 (S. D. N. Y. 1930) ; Dietrich v. U. S.
S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 59 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1932); Shea
v. Export S. S. Corp., 253 N. Y. 17, 170 N. E. 477 (1930), rel'g 226 App. Div.
696, 233 N. Y. Supp. 893 (1929) ; Filippo v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 228 App. Div. 115, 239 N. Y. Supp. 323 (1930) ; Duffy v. U. S. S. B.
Emergency Fleet Corporation, 240 N. Y. Supp. 875 (1930). See also, Schaefer v.
U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 242 N. Y. Supp. 522 (1930) in which
an action against the Fleet Corporation based on liability arising out of operation for the United States of a merchant vessel was held not within the jurisdiction of the state court when the judgment was payable out of the United States
Treasury.
117286 Fed. 918 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1923).
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it was held that a common law action against the Fleet
Corporation for damage to cargo carried by it was not within the provisions of this Act. Likewise, a libel in personam brought for loss of
cargo because of deviation was permitted against the Fleet Corpora19
tion in Smith v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, the court
saying that the Suits in Admiralty Act did not prevent a suit in admiralty against the Fleet Corporation under ordinary rules but was designed to eliminate and replace libel in rem against vessels of the United
States or the Corporation.l9a And Wallace v. U. S. S. B. Emergency
1 20 held that a common law action by an employee for
Fleet Corporation
injuries could be maintained, the Act not excluding it.
This Act applies to any corporation in which the United States
or its representatives own the entire outstanding capital stock, except
the Panama Railroad Company. The vessels owned and operated by
the Inland Waterways are evidently exempt from seizure under a libel
2
in rem, leaving only the admiralty remedy of a libel in personam.1 3'
The Shipping Act of 1916 authorized the President to transfer to the
Shipping Board vessels owned by the Panama Railroad, and, presumably, after they have been transferred they come within the admiralty rules relating to government vessels. When the ships are being operated directly by the Panama Railroad they evidently are considered private merchant vessels and subject to the general admiralty
laws, including libel in rein.
(To be concluded)

"'285 Fed. 647 (S. D. N. Y. 1922).
=2 F. (2d) 390 (S.D. N. Y. 1924).
" See also, Marshall Hall Grain Co. v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 14 F. (2d) 141 (D. C. Mass. 1926).
'0 5 F. (2d) 234 (W. D. Wash. 1925). See also, Lindgren v. U. S. S. B.
Merchant Fleet Corporation, 55 F. (2d) 117 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).
' See, in addition to cases in note 115, supra, It re Boyer, 109 U. S. 629, 3
Sup. Ct. 434, 27 L. ed. 1056 (1884) ; Perry v. Haines, 191 U. S. 17, 24 Sup. Ct.
8, 48 L. ed. 73 (1903).

